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Abstract
The aim of this article is to investigate the effects of the bidding strategies of leading firms
on market equilibria. The analysis focuses on the Italian wholesale electricity market from
2015 to 2018. The purpose is to assess if the observed market equilibria are the results of
a competitive setting or if more competitive equilibria could have occurred. We use the
methodology of synthetic supply proposed by Ciarreta et al. (2010a). This way, a new set
of synthetic prices and quantities is computed. The comparison between the actual and
synthetic prices allows us to assess the effects of market power on the actual equilibria.
Results suggest that whilst there is a significant impact on prices, quantities seem not to be
affected, due to the inelastic demand. Moreover, our findings suggest that the main impacts
occurred during 2017 especially during those months where above average heating and cooling
were required.
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1 Introduction
The Italian electricity market was subject to several changes over the past two decades.
Indeed, after liberalization, the market experienced different settings such as the evolution
of the bidding zones and of the intraday markets, the improvement of market coupling, the
massive introduction of RES and the reduction of market power asymmetries.
It is important to keep in mind that the Italian electricity market is characterized by
a large share of generation based on coal and gas and the absence of nuclear generation.
However, what is remarkable is the structural change that renewable sources produced in
the last years, which affected the bidding behaviors of fossil fuel plants. Indeed, according
to Bigerna et al. (2016) the total electricity consumption, generated by RES, drastically
increased shifting from 3-4% to 30% between 2010 and 2013. RES, due to their zero marginal
costs, tended to significantly affect prices by lowering them. In particular, the sizeable
generation produced by solar panels reduced the profit margins of several power plants during
the day hours. However, during the night, when the production from solar panels fell, the
owners of fossil fuel plants exercised their market power again in order to compensate the
losses sustained during the day hours.
Despite the fact that the issue related to market power asymmetries has been substantially
tackled in these years, uncompetitive behaviors seem to persist. Several examples can be
highlighted and quoted. Probably, the most interesting case, occurred in the first months of
2016. Some owners of fossil fuels power plants were capable of drastically increasing their
revenues by applying bidding strategies intended to deliberately unbalance the market to
achieve extremely high profits in the ancillary service market. This case will be discussed
in the literature review. In addition, the exercise of market power may increase when the
imported supply drops or during the maintenance of transmission power cables. Therefore,
it is extremely relevant to analyse the operators’ behaviors and study their bidding strategies
as they keep changing and evolving over time.
This study aims to provide further evidence on the market monitoring field by applying the
technique of synthetic supply proposed by Ciarreta et al. (2010a). In particular, the Italian
Day-Ahead market is considered as a case study and its hourly equilibria are analysed. The
goal of this paper is to show if the actual equilibria are the result of a competitive setting or
if more competitive equilibria might have been possible. Moreover, an estimate of Consumer
Surplus Loss will be computed and an alternative version of Lerner Index will be provided.
Our findings will be discussed with the aim of achieving a broader and wider understanding
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of the Italian electricity market.
2 Literature Review
Market manipulation has been widely discussed in recent years. This topic, due to its com-
plexity and vastness, involves different disciplines. Indeed, in order to have a good under-
standing of the definition of market manipulation and of the principal techniques for its
detection, it is necessary to have a sufficient degree of knowledge of several arguments. The
study of this subject requires: a deep understanding of the structure of the market and of its
dynamics and history; an advanced knowledge of economics and statistics; and a sufficient
but necessary overview of law and electrical engineering. For this reason, several approaches
have been proposed for analyzing market manipulation. Each approach is characterized by
the weights that its authors give to these different disciplines. Pinczynski and Kasperow-
icz (2016) and Prabhakar Karthikeyan et al. (2013) offer two reviews about the different
approaches and techniques that have been adopted over these decades.
In this section the main arguments discussed will be microeconomics and law. First it
is important to define what is considered market manipulation from a legal point of view.
REMIT (Regulation of Energy Market Integrity and Transparency) and its guidance proposed
by ACER (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators) clarify the legal steps required
for the identification of market manipulation. Many articles were published on this topic.
Feltkamp (2013) proposes a deep analysis of REMIT and gives a detailed interpretation of
this regulation. Harris and Ledgerwood (2012) present a concise but complete overview of
REMIT. According to these authors, REMIT and the guidance published by ACER do not
shed enough light on the concept of market manipulation. In fact, "these definitions were
too broad to be easily understood and applied"1. For this reason, these authors suggested
an alternative point of view which indicated the legal steps that should be required for the
identification of a market manipulation. It is important to highlight that a legal interpretation
of empirical results is necessary. In fact, in order to claim whether market manipulation
occurred or not, it is essential to understand if the observed strategic behavior identification
can be considered a market manipulation or only an uncompetitive behavior. Trigger, Target
and Nexus are a good starting point for the legal interpretation of results (see Harris and
Ledgerwood (2012), page 3). Once a general legal overview is in place it is possible to proceed
1Harris and Ledgerwood (2012), page 1.
2
with the assessment of market power.
In the literature, there are many articles that discuss how firms may exercise their market
power. It is possible to analyse this topic from several perspectives by applying different tech-
niques. For example, Bosco et al. (2013) analysed the bidding strategy of Enel Produzione
S.p.A. by studying its profit functions. This approach allowed them to understand when Enel
Produzione S.p.A. was exerting its pivotal position. Wolak (2003) studied the market power
of five leading operators in California. In this paper, the estimates of their Lerner Indexes are
provided. As the marginal costs are unknown, the author proposes to analyse these measures
through the estimation of the elasticity of every hourly residual demand faced by each of
these companies. By contrast, it is possible to estimate a Lerner Index for operator i by
estimating its marginal costs. Ciarreta and Espinosa (2010a) proposed an alternative version
of the Lerner Index based on synthetic prices. Bosco et al. (2012) estimated the marginal
cost functions for some of the main Italian leading operators and provided further evidence
of their Lerner Indexes.
Furthermore, it is essential to bear in mind that leading operators might exploit their
market power jointly. A joint bidding strategy could be undertaken by an illegal cartel or,
more simply, by tacit collusion. However, from an empirical point of view, it is extremely
difficult to test whether collusion occurred or not and it is almost impossible to prove if it
was intentional (the so called "probatio diabolica"). Macatangay (2003) investigated whether
tacit collusion occurred in the wholesale electricity market of England and Wales at the end
of the 90s. The firms suspected of this misbehavior were National Power and PowerGen.
The bidding strategies of the operators were analysed. In particular the empirical analysis
was run in two stages. In the first step, the author tested whether the bidding strategies
of National Power and PowerGen differed from the others. In the second one, the existence
of inter-dependence and co-ordination of the the leading operators’ bidding strategies was
investigated. However, despite the intriguing results, the author states that it is not possible
to claim if tacit collusion occurred. Sweeting (2007) further investigates this case claiming
that "their behavior was consistent with tacit collusion"2.
Market splitting and renewables constitute further key elements for a in-depth analysis
of competition. Bigerna et al. (2016) take into account market splitting in the computation
of the Lerner Index, in order to have a more accurate estimate of market power. Indeed,
the zonal pricing system may be used strategically by some operators. Furthermore, these
2Sweeting (2007), page 654.
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authors showed how the bidding behaviors of fossil fuels plants changed after the massive
introduction of RES. In particular, it seems that solar panels caused a fall in daytime prices
decreasing the relevance of combined cycle gas plants. On the contrary, findings show that
during the night the owners of combined cycle gas plants exercised their market power more
often. Ciarreta et al. (2017) analysed the effects of RES on fossil fuels plants for the Spanish
electricity market. Their findings show that the massive introduction of RES in the market
affected the bidding behaviors of fossil fuel plants but only in the short run.
The majority of the available literature focuses on the day-ahead market. Most of the
time, intra-day and ancillary service markets are not matters of discussion. However, for
a wide and deep analysis of competition in the electricity market it is important to always
keep in mind that wholesale electricity market constitutes only the "tip of the iceberg". In
2016, an interesting and complete investigation was carried out by Luigi Gabriele, Rete Italia
Consumatori3. The analysis reported in this document shows how, in the first semester of
2016, some fossil fuel plants were capable to achieve extremely high revenues, in the ancil-
lary service market, subsequent to strategic behaviors in day-ahead and intraday markets.
The Italian Regulatory Authority for Energy (ARERA)4 stated that anomalous behaviours
occurred during these months. In particular, some companies implemented some strategies
in order to achieve extra profit in the ancillary service market, namely electricity withdrawal
or overbidding. The aim was to unbalance the regular dynamics of the markets in order for
their plants to be necessary in the ancillary service market, where prices were way higher
than in wholesale and intraday markets.
3 Market Structure
Italian electricity market is divided in six macro areas: North, Center North, Center South,
South, Sicily and Sardinia (See Figure 1). These zones are connected to each other and with
other countries (France, Switzerland, Austria, Slovenia, Greece and Malta) via transmission
power cables.
The Italian electricity market is mainly composed by Spot Electricity Market and Forward
Electricity Market. The analysis proposed in this chapter focuses only on the Day-Ahead
Market ("Mercato del Giorno Prima") which is a component of the Spot Electricity Market.
3The report is available at the following link
4ARERA’s reports are available in the references.
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The other main components are: the Intra-Day Market and the Ancillary Service Market.
Typically the market starts with the Day-Ahead Market’s auction and an equilibrium is
established. After that, Intra-day markets’ auctions occur and in every auction an equilibrium
is achieved. Both Day-Ahead Market’s auction and Intra-Day Markets’ ones are uniform price
auctions. The final market is the Ancillary Service Market, which consists of several sessions.
This is a "pay-as-bid" market. At the end of this procedure the market is balanced.
Figure 1: Market Splitting vs No Market Splitting (Zones)a
(a) 12/01/2017 02:00 am (b) 12/01/2017 05:00 pm
Fig (a) shows a case of no market splitting where all the zonal prices are the same.
Fig (b) shows a case where market splitting occurs: zonal prices are not equal.
Source: Gestore dei Mercati Energetici S.p.A.
aHere follows the list of the zones (in bold the currently active zones):
* Six geographical zones: NORD, CNOR, CSUD, SUD, SICI, SARD.
* Five poles of limited production: MFTV, ROSN, FOGN, BRNN, PRGP.
* Eight foreign virtual zones: FRAN, SVIZ, AUST, SLOV, CORS, COAC, GREC, MALT.
* Three foreign virtual zones for market coupling: BSP,XFRA, XAUS.
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Day-Ahead Market
Day-Ahead Market is structured as a uniform price hourly auction. Each auction opens 9
days before the target hour and it closes one day before. During this time lapse, operators
can submit orders. Each order is a pair containing a price and a quantity. Buyers submit
bids whereas sellers submit offers. Each supplier can submit a maximum of four offers from
every power plant they own. Therefore, each offer is associated with a specific power plant.
The Independent System Operator (ISO) receives and registers these bids/offers. In the first
instance, it "translates" the bids (submitted by buyers) at zero price. Indeed, these bids
are intended to be "at any price" and the price is converted from 0 e to 3000 e (maximum
price). Once this procedure has been accomplished, the ISO proceeds with the computation
of the demand and supply curves. These curves are computed as the cumulative sum of all
the accepted/rejected orders. In particular, for demand, bids are ordered with a decreasing
price criterion whereas, for supply, offers are ordered with an increasing price criterion (more
precisely they are ordered through the "Merit Order" condition but this criterion will not
be discussed here). Therefore, at the end of this procedure there will be two step curves
for each hour. The intersection point between the two curves is the hourly equilibrium. It
may happen that the two step functions intersect not in a point but rather in a segment.
This segment can be vertical or horizontal. The former indicates a situation where there is
price indeterminacy whereas the latter indicates quantity indeterminacy. In the first case,
the equilibrium is set with the mid-price rule: the middle point of the intersection segment
is chosen. In the second case, the welfare is maximized if the equilibrium is set when the
quantity is maximized: the far right point of the segment is chosen. This equilibrium, is
the unconstrained hourly equilibrium that does not take into account market congestion. In
other words, unconstrained equilibrium assumes unlimited available transmission capacity
(ATC)5. It may happen that, after the national auction, a zone bought more electricity
than the production system of that zone sold. Thus, it is possible to send into that zone
a certain amount of electricity. If this amount satisfies the demand, market splitting does
not occur (See Figure 1(a) and 2(a)). On the contrary, if this amount is not enough and
the transmission power cable is not able to carry more electricity, market splitting occurs.
If market splitting occurs, two or more zonal auctions are automatically created and new
equilibria are computed. This procedure is repeated until transmission power constraints are
5Italian electricity markets is characterized by more than one zone. Therefore, more than one zonal price
may occur.
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not violated any more. The results of this procedure are different zonal prices as results of
zonal auctions (See Figures 1(b), 2(b) and 2(c)). At the end sellers will sell the electricity at
the zonal price whereas the buyer will buy the electricity according to PUN ("Prezzo Unico
Nazionale") which is the final national price computed as the weighted average of zonal
prices. Foreign buyers pay the zonal price.
Figure 2: Market Splitting vs No Market Splitting (Curves)a
(a) 12/01/2017 02:00 am
All Zones
(b) 12/01/2017 05:00 pm
CNOR, NORD, AUST, CORS, FRAN,
MFTV, SLOV, SVIZ, BSP.
(c) 12/01/2017 05:00 pm
CSUD, SARD, SICI, SUD, COAC,
BRNN, FOGN, GREC, PRGP, ROSN,
MALT.
Fig (a) shows a case of no market splitting where only one auction occurs.
Fig (b) and Fig (c) show a case where market splitting occurs: more than one auction occurs.
Source: Gestore dei Mercati Energetici S.p.A.
aThe red dot indicates the accepted offer quantitiy (supply) whereas the blue one indicates the accepted
bid quantity (demand). The dotted line indicates the hourly zonal market clearing price. The difference
between the two quantities depends on the electricity flows and market coupling. For example, in 2(a) the
price is 76.60 e/MWh the accepted bid quantity is 27,663 MWh, the accepted offer quantity is 24,236 MWh
and the total quantity sold by XFRA and XAUS is 3,427 MWh.
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4 Data
Two sources compose the data set: Independent System Operator and REF-E, an Italian
consulting company operating in the energy sector. In order to present the structure of the
data in the clearest way, they are explained separately here below.
4.1 Independent System Operator
The analysis focuses on the day-ahead market, the so called "Mercato del Giorno Prima"
(MGP). The following information is available on the website of the Italian Independent
System Operator ("Gestore dei Mercati Energetici S.p.A."):
1. Public domain bids/offers data
2. Market coupling data
3. Day-ahead market unconstrained prices.
4.1.1 Public domain bids/offers data
All the bidding schedules of the operators are registered in the public domain bids/offers data.
The analysis has been carried out using four years of data: from March6 2015 to December
2018. Each annual data set contains twenty columns and approximately 25 million rows.
The main variables used for the data analysis are: quantity offered (adjusted), price,
purpose (bid/offer), status (accepted and rejected; incomplete bids/offers are discarded from
the sample), operator’s name, power plant’s name and hour. Bilateral contracts are included
in the bidding schedule as they must be taken into account for the computation of the
equilibrium point.
4.1.2 Market coupling data
From February 2015, there are three market coupling "zones": Slovenia Market Coupling,
Austria Market Coupling and France Market Coupling. The quantities that every hour flow
across the border (in-going/outgoing) affect the hourly equilibria.
6Before March 2015 (precisely the 24th of February) there was another algorithm for the computation of
NAT. Therefore, it is not possible, with the R code developed, to perfectly calculate the unconstrained price
before this month.
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In the data provided by the ISO, these quantities are not represented by bids/offers
submitted by operators but they are available as aggregate amounts. Therefore, it is only
possible to know that a certain quantity has been bought/sold at a certain hour. This is
enough for the computation of the equilibria. This hourly information has been coded as
bids/offers and added to the daily public domain bids/offers data (bids at 3000 e and offers
at 0 e). This way, the R code, developed to compute the unconstrained market hourly
equilibria (NAT), is able to recognize them as orders and take them into account in the
construction of the demand and supply curves. Nevertheless, this way of coding the market
coupling data does not take into account the hypothesis of market coupling as the price
setter.
4.1.3 Day-ahead market unconstrained prices
Information on the unconstrained prices is available on the website of the ISO. This informa-
tion has been used to check whether the R code was working properly or if some errors had
occurred during the computation of the hourly equilibria: if the difference between the ac-
tual unconstrained equilibrium published in the ISO’s web page and the actual unconstrained
equilibrium computed by the R code was zero the hourly equilibrium was considered correct.
At the end of this double-check process, it is possible to claim that the R code works properly
in 97% (approximately) of the cases. The remaining 3% contains a set of different errors.
There are mainly three types of errors that have been recognized: approximation error (thus
the difference between the two prices was almost zero), wrong computation of the equilibria
when vertical segment intersection occurred and the cases where market coupling was the
price setter. In the case where the NAT computed from the R code differed from the one
published by GME, the observation was dropped.
4.2 REF-E
Thanks to REF-E7, which provided extensive information about Italian power plants, it was
possible to map a consistent share of power plants and identify their main specifications.
Here follows the list of the specifications provided:
- Zone: The macro-area (North, Center North, ...).
- Operator: The operators’ names.
7Webpage available at: https://www.ref-e.com/it
9
- Data-in and Data-out: when the power plant started to operate in the liberalized market
and eventually when it stopped.
- Technology: The technology involved in the production, for example: Run-of-River
hydro, Pumped-Storage, et cetera.
- Energy Efficiency: REF-E estimated the hourly consumption curve of several thermal
power plants with a parabolic model (where on the x-axis there is the quantity produced
expressed in MWwhereas on the y-axis there is the amount of heat, expressed in Gcal/h,
that must be generated in order to produce a certain amount of MW).
5 Methodology
The aim of this study is to analyse if the equilibria, that occurred during the four years
considered, are the results of a competitive setting or if more competitive equilibria might
have been possible. As discussed above, an equilibrium is a pair of price and quantity and
it is the results of all the bids/offers submitted. From a theoretical point of view, if all the
suppliers were price takers the equilibria would be the perfectly competitive equilibria. In
reality, no operator is a price taker. However, the market is characterized by market power
asymmetries on the supply side. Thus, there are operators with a limited market share and
some other operators with a more consistent market power.
The bidding strategy of an operator includes a variety of different elements: types of plants
and their technologies, the amount of plants, the market zone and several other aspects such
as markup. Indeed, it is evident from the literature, that strong operators are potentially
capable of altering equilibria in order to achieve higher profits. This study aims to analyse
what would have happened if leading operators had behaved as small operators. Small
operators tend to behave more similarly to a fringe firm rather than a leading operator (see
Akgün (2004) and Ciarreta and Espinosa (2010b)). Theoretically, a fringe firm should submit
offers that coincide with its marginal costs. A small operator will not submit an offer that
exactly coincides with its marginal costs, but its bidding strategy will be closer to its marginal
cost than a strong operator. Therefore, the task is to force the leading operators to behave
as small operators. This way, it is possible to observe what equilibria would have occurred
and investigate if there are any differences between these two sets of equilibria.
In this case study, only one of the largest Italian generators is considered the Leading
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Operator (L.O., hereafter) whereas the other firms considered during the data analysis are
considered small generators. In order to achieve this goal, a synthetic supply must be com-
puted for every hour. As first step, it is important to define the following expressions:
Actual Supply:
STotalm =
m∑
i=1
yi
The total amount of offers is given by y = (y1, y2, ..., ym).
Residual Supply:
SResidualn =
n∑
j=1
xj
The total amount of offers except the ones of the leading company is given by x = (x1, x2, ..., xN).
Leading Operator Supply:
SL.O.l =
l∑
k=1
zk
The total amount of offers submitted by the L.O. are given by z = (z1, z2, ..., zL). Therefore:
STotalm = S
Residual
n + S
L.O.
l
The crucial point is to create SL.O.Syntheticp (note that p 6= l) such that:
STotalSynthetict = S
Residual
n + S
L.O.Synthetic
p
This can be achieved by following the methodological approach proposed by Ciarreta and
Espinosa (2010a). It requires two steps: association of the plants and translation of
the supply schedule . The following two subsections are dedicated to this procedure.
5.1 Association of the plants
In the electricity market the marginal costs of the plants depend on several inputs such
as: type, technology, vintage, installed capacity and energy efficiency. For this reason, it
is reasonable to claim, for example, that the marginal cost of a coal thermal plant built in
1965 does not differ too much from the marginal cost of a plant with the same specifications.
Thus, given that the L.O. has a set of plants the task is to find the most similar plants in the
market. Therefore, the aim is to associate the highest amount of plants with strict criteria.
The stricter the matching criteria are, the smaller the bias will result. Every plant has been
matched with at least the criteria of type8 and technology. Unfortunately, these two criteria
8Type: Thermal, Hydro, Wind, Solar, et cetera.
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are not strict enough to permit a reliable association process for each power plant. For this
reason, in order to allow a reliable matching this procedure has been conducted separately
for zero marginal cost plants and for thermal plants.
It is possible to associate zero marginal cost plants using only type, technology, data-in,
data-out and zone9. The zero marginal costs plants involved in the data analysis are Hydro-
electric (only Run-of-River and Storage; Pumped-Storage have marginal costs depending on
the type of the pump so they have not been taken into account in the association process)
and Wind power plants. The association process for the thermal plants followed different
criteria: type, technology, data-in, data-out and energy efficiency. Ciarreta and Espinoza
(2010a) proposed vintage as an association criterion. In this paper, the association of ther-
mal plants is based on: type, technology, data-in, data-out and energy efficiency.10 The latter
criterion is not based on an existing literature stream. Indeed, this idea is new. This criteria
is based on finding the most similar plant through the energy efficiency curve. Therefore, the
competitor’s plant with the closest curve to the one of the leading operator’s plant has been
chosen among the list. This was done by computing the integrals between the selected leading
operator energy efficiency curve and the ones of other power plants belonging to competitors.
The limitation of this method is that each plant has an interval of production and for the
computation of the integrals, between the L.O.’s curve and each other curve, the minimum
and maximum production power of the leading operator’s plant have been chosen as the
extremes of the interval for each integral. At the end of this procedure, a list of integrals is
available for each leading operator’s plant. The competitor’s plant with the lowest integral
is chosen for the association.
A further clarification is provided by Figure 3. The figure illustrates an example of the
association technique based on the energy efficiency criteria. Assume that in the market there
9For zero marginal cost plants, the Zone criterion permits to control for the exogenous inputs (for example
wind power) as they depend on the geographical zones.
10Only a few associations have been made using very similar technologies because the same technologies
were not available in some cases.
Moreover, the Zone criterion was not taken into account in the association process of the thermal plants.
This can be considered a source of bias as the bidding strategies can be related to the bidding zones. However,
Zone criterion would result in a further constraint upon the association process. In fact, it would drastically
reduce the amount of power plants available for the association of each L.O.’s power plant. Therefore, it is
favourable to identify the most similar plants at a national level than the most similar ones within the same
bidding zones. Furthermore, as the analysis focuses on the unconstrained prices, the Zone criterion is less
important.
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are only three power plants (Black, Blue, Red), with the same technology, having efficiency
curves represented by the three straight lines: Black (Leading Operator), Red (Fringe Firm
1) and Blue (Fringe Firm 2). The aim is to find what is the most similar available plant (Red
or Blue) in the market to the Leading Operator one (Black). It turns out that the Blue has
an efficiency curve more similar to the Black rather then the Red, as the integral computed
between Blue and Black is smaller than the one computed between Red and Black. For this
reason, the Blue will be chosen as the plant to be associated with the Black.
Figure 3: Efficiency Curves
Q(MW )
Φ(Gcal/h)
PlantLeadingOperator
PlantFringeF irm1
PlantFringeF irm2
QLeadingOperatorMin Q
LeadingOperator
Max
Overall, approximately 50% of the L.O.’s power plants have been associated.1112 At the end
of this procedure, each plant of the leading operator has three matched plants: first best,
second best and third best. There is the need of a second and third best, chosen with the
same association criteria, because it may happen that given a certain hour the first best is
not present in the data set. If this happens, it is replaced by the second and the synthetic
offer is computed referring to the second best. Obviously, if the second best is missing, the
11Due to a data constraint it was not possible to associate the entire set of the L.O.’s power plants reliably.
12We assume the unmatched plants would have the same bidding strategy within the synthetic supply
curve as in the observed bid stack.
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R code looks for the third one. If the third one is not available either, the R code skips the
association and proceeds with the following one.
5.2 Translation of the offers
Once the plants have been matched, it is possible to proceed with the "translation" of the
bidding strategies. In other words, the aim is to impose the bidding strategy of the competitor
to the L.O. . This can be done by changing the bidding schedule of each leading operator’s
plant with the associated ones. For the sake of simplicity, assume that the aim is to match
the plant A (owned by the leading operator) with the plant B (owned by a fringe firm). This
procedure requires the following steps:
• Sum the quantity offered by plant B (we get qBtot). Divide each quantity offered for the
total quantity. This way, we will get a vector of proportions that has from one to four
entries (each supplier can submit a maximum of four offers from every power plant they
own). Define this vector as qBproportion = (qB1 /qBtot, ..., qBo /qBtot) with o ∈ (1, 2, 3, 4).
• Sum the quantity offered by plant A (we get qAtot). Multiply qAtot by each entry of
qBproportion. This means that the synthetic supply schedule of A will have the same
amount of offers submitted by B. This way, the leading operator uses the same bidding
strategy of a smaller firm. Therefore, we force the leading operator to behave like a
smaller firm.
At the end of this procedure, once that all the offer schedules have been translated, we will
get SL.O.Syntheticp . Thus, the synthetic supply is given by:
STotalSynthetict = S
Residual
n + S
L.O.Synthetic
k
(note that t 6= m).
This way, two intersection points are obtained every hour. Next section explains what the
aim of the empirical analysis is.
6 Empirical Analysis
Synthetic supply method allows us to obtain two set of different equilibria for each hour.
The actual equilibria are the ones that we observe in the real market whereas the synthetic
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ones derive from the intersection between demand curves and synthetic supplies. The latter
are obtained by forcing the leading operator to behave as smaller firms. For this reason it
is reasonable to assume that synthetic equilibria are more competitive than the actual ones:
lower prices and higher quantities. However, the electricity market is characterized by a very
inelastic demand. Thus, only the statement referring to prices seems to be true.
A further clarification is provided by an example illustrated in Figure 4. This plot shows
a graphical representation of the methodology proposed above. It shows the two hourly
market clearing prices. The actual equilibrium is the intersection point between Demand (in
blue) and Actual (in red) whereas the synthetic equilibrium is the intersection point between
Demand and Synthetic Supply (in orange). Furthermore, the yellow area represents the
consumer surplus loss.
Figure 4: Actual Equilibrium, Synthetic Equilibrium and Consumer Surplus Loss
Q(MWh)
P (e/MWh)
SActual SSynthetic
D
3000
0
PA
PS
QA QS
D:Demand; SActual:Actual Supply, SSynthetic: Synthetic Supply; PA: Actual Price; PS: Synthetic
Prices; QA: Actual Quantity; QS: Synthetic Quantity.
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The task of the empirical analysis is two-fold: on one hand it investigates if there is any
statistically difference in means between the actual prices and the synthetic one whereas,
on the other, it computes the consumer surplus loss in order to evaluate the impact of the
bidding strategy of the L.O.. Moreover, an alternative version of Lerner Index is presented
and discussed. Therefore, the section is divided in three subsections where these results are
discussed separately.
6.1 Actual Prices vs Synthetic Prices
The aim is to verify whether actual prices are on average higher than synthetic ones and
to test whether the difference is statistically significant. Define the actual prices and the
synthetic ones as the following vectors with length 876013:
pActual = (pActual1 , p
Actual
2 , ..., p
Actual
8760 )
pSynthetic = (pSynthetic1 , p
Synthetic
2 , ..., p
Synthetic
8760 )
However not all the hours are in the sample as already explained above.
Now the point is to analyse whether the actual equilibria differ from the synthetic ones. In
particular, the scope of this study is to investigate to what extent the actual prices are higher
than the ones computed under the assumption of more competitive bidding strategies. Results
are presented in the appendix and are organized in four tables, one for each year, containing
the means of actual and synthetic prices computed for every month in different intervals
of hours. Monthly means of actual and synthetic quantities are presented. Furthermore,
the monthly difference in the means of the actual and synthetic prices and quantities are
reported. Moreover, Figure A.1 illustrates the trends of the monthly difference in means,
between actual and synthetic prices, for total hours, day hours and night hours. Results
suggest that actual prices have been significantly higher than synthetic ones. The most
outstanding discrepancies occurred during 2017, reaching a peak in monthly difference in
means of 8.03 e/MWh (See Table A.2 in the Appendix). It seems that the prices during
the day have been slightly higher than the ones occurred by night. However, there are not
remarkable differences between the monthly means of day prices and night ones.
Moreover, a t-test has been run on annual prices to investigate if there is a statistical
difference in means between actual and synthetic prices. The null hypothesis is rejected for
13Except for 2016 that has 8784 hours and 2015 for which the first two months are not taken into account.
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every year confirming the hypothesis that the two time series differ in mean. However, it
should be pointed out that the main assumptions of the t-test are not met. Thus, in order to
get rid of time dependency which compromises the assumption of independent observations
and the lack of normal distribution, due to the log-normality nature of prices, of actual and
synthetic prices, a bootstrap technique has been implemented. Each annual data set, com-
posed by approximately 8760 pairs of hourly actual and synthetic prices, has been randomly
sampled 4000 times. Each sample contains 1000 random observations. The mean of each
sample has been computed and the t-test has been run on this new data set. This way, the
assumptions of normal distribution and independent observations are not violated.
On the contrary, findings show that there are not statistical differences in means between
actual quantities and synthetic ones, due to the inelastic demand. Obviously, synthetic
quantities are higher than actual ones.
6.2 Consumer Surplus Loss
In this section the estimates of the consumer surplus losses are discussed. Consumer surplus
loss has been computed, for each hour, as the following area14:
CSLAbs = (PA − PS) ∗QA
Thereafter, these values have been summed on a monthly and annual basis. Moreover, in
order to have a comparative measure that helps to assess the size of the Consumer Surplus
Loss, the following measure is proposed:
CSLRel =
(PA − PS) ∗QA ∗ 100
PA ∗QA
These results are available in the appendix. Ciarreta et al. (2010a) computed the Consumer
Surplus Loss as a rectangle trapeze thus adding the triangle area below
(PA − PS) ∗ (QS −QA)
2
However, the choice of excluding the triangle in the estimates has a double motivation. The
first one is that it risks a slight overestimate of the Consumer Surplus Loss. The second one,
which is the most relevant one, is that the demand is very inelastic. Thus, the difference
14Figure 4 provides a graphical example. The estimated Consumer Surplus Loss is represented by the
dotted yellow area.
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between the synthetic quantity and the actual one is extremely small. Therefore, the area of
the triangle is not significantly affecting the Consumer Surplus Loss.
Results suggest that Consumer Surplus Loss has been constantly increasing from 2015
to 2017 reaching its peak in 2017. From the end of 2017 it seems that this growing pattern
slowed down, decreasing significantly in 2018. Figure 5 illustrates the Consumer Surplus Loss
over the years of analysis.
Figure 5: Consumer Surplus Loss
The plot illustrates the consumer surplus loss from 2015 to 2018.
January and February 2015 are note reported for the reasons explained above.
The interpretation of these results must be two-fold. In fact, it is appropriate to consider
both the general and specific factors. The former refer to events which affect the the regular
market dynamics whereas the latter refer to both the data analysis and the case study. The
results suggest that the main peaks of Consumer Surplus Loss occurred during the high
level of electricity demand. Said levels appear mainly during those months when heating
and cooling were necessary. Indeed, when the demand is high, exercising market power may
become easier and the main market operators could take advantage of this. However, the
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complexity of the dynamics that characterize the electricity markets, means that finding a
unique general motivation that explains these results is not possible. In fact, the market is
constantly affected by internal and external shocks. For example in the first six months of
2016, Consumer Surplus Loss might have reduced as some other market operators increased
their revenues. Indeed, from a data point of view Consumer Surplus Loss increases when the
L.O. raises its markup and the competitors fail to do so. On the contrary, it decreases in two
cases. First of all, if the competitors increase their markup and the one of the L.O. remains
fixed the Consumer Surplus Loss decreases. Secondly, if the L.O. decreases its markup and
those of the competitors remain constant. However, even if the question remains open, results
suggest that a more competitive setting occurred in 2018 compared to the previous year.
6.3 Lerner Index
Ciarreta et al. (2010a) proposed an alternative version of the Lerner Index. In this section,
the standard version and the alternative one are presented. Thereafter, results are discussed.
The traditional version of Lerner Index is defined as:
LITraditional =
p−mc
p
The alternative version of Lerner Index is defined as:
LIAlternative =
PA − PS
PA
Where PA and PS are respectively the actual and synthetic prices.
This latter version can be consider as a lower bound measure of the standard LI as PS > mc.
Results are presented in Table 1. It is crucial to interpret them taking into account that this
is a lower bound measure (as the competitors’ markup is included in this index) and that
only approximately 50% of the L.O.’s power plants have been matched.
Table 1: Average Alternative Lerner Index
Period Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Year
2015 - - 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.06
2016 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.08
2017 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.12
2018 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.07
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7 Limitations, Strengths and Future Research
Even though this study tried to minimize biases, it is extremely hard to control for some of
them. In this section the main sources of bias will be discussed.
The first two limitations refer to the market structure: the unconstrained price (NAT)
is considered and only the day-ahead market has been taken into account. Given that NAT
does not take into account zonal prices, there is a source of bias, as some information on
bidding strategies related to the bidding zones are not considered. However, NAT is an
indicator of real prices. On the contrary, the analysis which only focusses on the day-ahead
market does not take into account relevant information contained in the successive market
sessions. Nevertheless, the day-ahead market is the most relevant market as the largest
quantity of electricity is exchanged in this market (approximately 90% of the Spot Electricity
Markets).15 Thus, from this point of view, the analysis cannot be consider complete but is
surely important.
The other two main limitations are related to the association process. Indeed, even if
the most similar plants have been found and matched with the ones of the L.O., they are
just partially representative of the true marginal costs. Moreover, the bias increases with the
second and third best as the associated plant will reflect less the technological features of the
L.O. power plant. Furthermore, only 50% of the L.O.’s power plants were associated. This is
a further limitation as some bidding strategies have not been taken into account. The reason
why the other power plants were not matched is related to the lack of a reliable association
process or to a data constraint. For these reasons, the results of this case study should not
be interpreted as a definitive market analysis but as a starting point for future research.
However, this research contributes to the existing literature by adding new evidence and
findings. It is important to point out that this technique partially controls for start-up costs
(as they are included in the competitors’ bidding strategies). For this reason, they are capable
of representing some market dynamics more than other methodologies, as there is a control
for start-up costs.
Moreover, the technique of synthetic supply can be applied in several ways 16. This study
focusses only on a case study of market power but the potential of this technique is extremely
15For example, in 2017 the total electricity exchanged in the Day-Ahead Market was 292 TWh whereas
in the Intraday Markets 25 TWh (see the GME report available in the references.)
16See for example Ciarreta et al. (2017) or Ciarreta et al. (2010b)
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broad.17 In particular, synthetic supply could be employed in the computation of competitive
benchmarks for the market. Indeed, it will be possible to obtain an estimate of benchmarks
of a perfect competitive market if the offers of all the power plants are calibrated on marginal
costs. Start-up costs may be included as well in order to achieve a more accurate set of
results.
8 Conclusion
Market monitoring is a difficult task, as the electricity market is a dynamic environment,
which constantly evolves both from a technological and a regulatory perspective. Therefore
the bidding strategies of the operators need to constantly adapt to achieve the best market
performance. It is essential to constantly monitor the evolution of these markets in order to
bring new evidence, methodologies, suggestions and policy recommendations.
The aim of this article is to provide further evidence on the topic and apply the synthetic
supply approach to the Italian electricity market. In fact, this methodology, which does
not follow the approach based on the inverse of the residual demand elasticity (see Wolak
(2003)), enables us to analyse the Italian electricity market presenting results from a new
perspective. Our results seem to suggest that a more competitive setting occurred in 2018
and that the market is experiencing a decreasing market power path, even though the results
highlight the presence of persistent and non-negligible Consumer Surplus Loss. However,
as previously discussed above, it is important to bear in mind that the question of whether
significant market power is being exercised remains open and that a further and deeper
analysis is required to extensively monitor the market. For this reason, even though the
findings presented are intriguing and contribute to the existing literature, it is appropriate to
stress that they are not definitive but rather a further step in developing a deeper and more
comprehensive market analysis.
17The methodology presented in this paper easily adapts to those markets where the offers are associated
with the power plants.
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